Latitudedevelopment advisory

Decisions
before drawings.

Indonesia · Philippines · Thailand · France

Independent real estate & urban development advisory for Southeast Asia, built on eight years of land development in France and two years advising on projects across the region. We help investors, landowners and developers decide what to build — and whether to build at all — before any capital is committed.

Independent real estate & urban development advisory for Southeast Asia. We help investors, landowners and developers decide what to build — and whether to build at all — before any capital is committed.

Start a conversation
2.0 HAN 8°40'S 115°10'EÉCH. 1:1000 EMPRISE CONSTRUCTIBLE
Real estate & urban development
France · Indonesia · Philippines · Thailand
Antoine Sailly · Founder
43°N  /  14°N
Our Missions

Latitude is engaged for one of three reasons.

Development Strategy

Real Estate

For landowners and investors, before anything is committed. What the land can carry, what the market will absorb, and what the numbers have to look like for the project to stand up.

  • Land and site assessment
  • Business & financial analysis
  • Market positioning
  • Feasibility and phasing
  • A written go or no-go

Southeast Asia Execution

Project Management

For European investors or developers with a future project in the region. We set up the holding structure with local lawyers and notaries before anything is signed then act as your owner's representative on the ground, accountable for the programme, the schedule and the relationships.

  • Ownership structuring with local counsel
  • Owner representation
  • Partner due diligence
  • Permitting coordination
  • Programme and site control

Masterplan Direction

Urban Design

For developers who have the land and need the scheme to be right. We are not architects. We are the owner's judgement on the design, and we hold the plan to the standard that makes it liveable and sellable.

  • Design brief and programme
  • Masterplan arbitration
  • Density and layout
  • Public realm structure
  • Long-term value
Where we work in a project
Bar height shows the depth of our involvement
01
Land
A parcel, an owner, an idea
Lead
02
Study
What it can carry, who buys, what it costs
Lead
03
Scheme
Layout, density, product
Lead
04
Consent
Municipality, permits, objections
Steering
05
Build
Roads, networks, construction
Monitoring
06
Sale or rent
Delivery and handover

Advising a client rather than investing yourself? We work behind wealth managers and asset managers as their technical layer — how that works.

Most projects are lost upstream

By the time an architect is appointed, the decisions that decide the outcome have already been made. What the land can carry. Who the buyer is. Whether the municipality will follow. They are the cheapest to get right and the most expensive to reverse.

Agricultural parcels and a service road in Southeast Asia
Where we work

Four markets we work in, three we watch.

France
ActiveResidential land development — where the method comes from
Active. Residential land development. Eight years taking projects from acquisition to delivery in a regulatory environment that forgives nothing. This is where the method comes from.
Indonesia
ActiveBali, Lombok, and the archipelago beyond
Active. Bali and Lombok, where we have delivered, and the rest of the archipelago — Sumbawa, Sumba, Flores, Sulawesi — where the same questions arrive earlier and the land has not been repriced yet. Lease structures, title chains, and the gap between what a foreign buyer is shown and what he is actually acquiring.
Philippines
ActiveCoastal and periurban residential
Active. Coastal and periurban residential. Land classification, access, and the practical reality of building at distance from Manila.
Thailand
ActiveCoastal and island resort markets
Active. Coastal and island resort markets. Foreign ownership limits, leasehold structures, and the difference between a market still growing and one that has already been bought.
Malaysia · Singapore
Vietnam · Cambodia
Laos
On researchFollowed, and studied on request
On research. We follow these markets and will study a specific opportunity in them. We will not pretend to know them the way we know the four above.
Dubai, UAE
AvailableMandates accepted; no local track record
Available. We take mandates in the Emirates and travel for them. We have not delivered a project there and will say so before you ask — what we bring is the method and the owner-side discipline, not a local track record.
Selected experience

Six projects, taken apart.

Rather than a portfolio: what was in the way, what was decided, and what it produced — including the one we advised a client not to buy.

Delivered villa at Ungasan, Bali, with pool and garden
Ungasan, BaliDelivered villa, let year-round at 85% occupancy08°50′S 115°09′E
Coastal land at Lombok with agricultural plots in the foreground
LombokPerspective on future land plots08°53′S 116°16′E
Aerial view of the delivered subdivision at Baziège
Baziège, France2 ha, 33 homes, delivered43°27′N 01°37′E
Southeast Asia
A plot that took four villas, and a budget that covered two
Kuta Lombok (Mong), Indonesia · Land search, feasibility & delegated project ownership · €52,000 / 1,100 m² · Ongoing
Open ↓Close ↑

MT and LB, French, engaged us in August 2025. They wanted two rental villas on Lombok, and they wanted somewhere to live on the island themselves. Those are two different briefs. The land had to answer both, or it was the wrong land.

Strategy, land search, feasibility and delegated project ownership. Project name: Terraflora. Clients anonymised at their request.

Land
1,100 m²
Land price
€52k
Villas designed
4
Built in phase 1
2
Isometric study of the four villas with plot and building areas
The feasibility — four villas on 1,100 m². The two drawn in full are phase one; the two shown as massing are the half deliberately left open.
Masterplan of the estate at Mong, Kuta Lombok
The estate the plot sits inside — masterplan by Blackwell Estate
Cleared platform and drainage channel on the site at Mong
Platform, drainage and the first setting-out on site — the stage that tells you whether an estate is being built or being sold

The brief had two answers in it

A rental villa wants the cheapest land a paying guest will still travel to. A home wants somewhere you would be happy to wake up. The two pull against each other on location, on plot size and on how fast you have to build — so we wrote the strategy before looking at a single parcel, and searched against a specification rather than reacting to what happened to be on the market.

The search, and the bet inside it

We went through what was genuinely available on Lombok in 2025 within their budget — not what was being marketed, which is a shorter and more expensive list. The parcel we recommended sits at Mong, on the Kuta side, inside a development operated by Blackwell Estate: 1,100 m² at €52,000, a little under €48 per square metre.

That price carried a bet. The plot is set back from the established Kuta strip, and land that far back is worth whatever the build-out around it eventually makes it worth. So we took the question to the developer and to the municipality rather than to a selling agent: the road and utility programme and when it lands, the build-out commitments, the zoning, what would and would not be permitted. The bet was priced. It was not assumed.

What the land could actually take

Four villas, not two:

VillaPlotBuildingPhase
#4243.00 m²84.85 m²1
#2193.30 m²76.19 m²1
#1230.31 m²112.56 m²2 — open
#3228.00 m²81.42 m²2 — open

894.61 m² of villa plots out of 1,100 m². The balance is access and shared circulation.

The phasing decision

No debt. A foreign buyer in Indonesia finances with equity or with expensive local debt, and MT and LB could not fund four villas at once. The obvious answer was to buy a smaller plot. We advised against it.

Instead: take the whole 1,100 m², build two villas now on the weaker half, and leave the better half untouched and undecided — to sell on once the estate around it is built and the land repriced, to build the two remaining villas and live in one, or to do something none of us can see from here.

Optionality is only worth something if it is real. So the plot division, the access, the drainage and the title chain were set up at the start, when they cost nothing to get right, so that the second half can be separated later without renegotiating with anyone. That is not a detail of the deal. It is the deal.

The structure

We took them through the notary and set up a PT PMA, the Indonesian foreign-investment company. It holds the building right in the company's own name, so the asset does not rest on a nominee arrangement — which Indonesian law does not recognise. It makes short-stay letting a declared activity, so the income can be received, taxed and repatriated legally. And it makes construction, furnishing, depreciation and running costs deductible against that income, so tax falls on the margin rather than on the gross rent.

It also carries a minimum capital requirement and periodic reporting, which is why we recommended one here and advised against one at Ungasan. The same structure is the right answer on four villas and the wrong one on a single €125,000 build.

What we are doing on it

  • Defined the strategy before the search, so the land was chosen against the brief rather than the brief bent to fit the land.
  • Verified the bet with the developer and the municipality — road, utilities, build-out, zoning, permitting — before the promise to purchase was signed.
  • Ran the feasibility to four villas, which is what turned a two-villa purchase into a phased asset with a second half worth holding.
  • Selected the architect, the contractor and the works supervisor, and act as delegated project owner through the notarial work, the PT PMA and the build.

Where it stands

  • Land under a preliminary sale agreement
  • Two villas in phase one at approximately €71,000 each — around €880 per square metre of built area
  • Land plus phase-one construction at approximately €194,000, before fees, furnishing and structure costs
  • Works from June 2027; mission ongoing through to delivery

What this shows

A budget that will not cover the whole site is not a reason to buy less land. It is a reason to buy the right land, and to decide at the outset — on the plan and on the title — what the untouched half is allowed to become.

Two first-time investors, an unclear lease, and a villa at 85% occupancy
Ungasan, Bali · Advisory & owner's representation · €125,000 · Delivered
Open ↓Close ↑

Two French investors, JT and CB, neither of whom had bought anything in Asia before, with land identified at Ungasan on the southern tip of Bali. The transaction was not a sale but a lease transfer, and neither the chain of title nor the remaining term was clear from what they had been shown. They were close to committing.

Advisory and owner's representation. Clients anonymised at their request.

Occupancy
85%
Payback
5–6 yrs
Project cost
€125k
Delivery
100%
Delivered villa at Ungasan with pool and garden
Ungasan, Bali — the programme sized to what the investors could carry, not to what the land could hold
Living and dining space of the delivered villa
Specification set against the target nightly rate — on a short-stay asset the finish is a yield input
Bedroom of the delivered villa
Let year-round at 85% occupancy
Workers excavating limestone foundations
Foundations cut into limestone · May 2023

Southern Bali is karst. The excavation set both the build cost and the programme — and it is the stage a remote owner never sees.

The mandate

Tell them whether the opportunity held, and if it did, match the project to what they could actually afford to carry. Then take it through to a delivered, letting asset.

What we did

  • Read the paper before the pitch. Contracts, land deeds, chain of title, and what the remaining lease term actually was — the single fact the whole return depended on, and the one least clearly presented to them.
  • Recommended a personal holding structure rather than a PT PMA. A foreign-owned company is the reflex answer in Indonesia and the wrong one at this scale: the compliance cost and reporting burden would have consumed a meaningful share of the yield on a €125,000 project.
  • Sized the product to the investors, not to the site. The land could have carried more. Their capacity to fund a longer build and a longer void could not. We set the programme against the second constraint.
  • Defined the architectural and landscape brief with the architect, then held the design to it — on the owners' side of the table rather than the designer's.
  • Modelled the return on seasonal occupancy, not on an annual average — an annualised assumption is how these projects are mis-sold.

The difficulty

The project had to be profitable and photogenic at once. On a short-stay rental the finish is not decorative — platform photography drives the booking rate, so it is a yield input with a cost attached. Spend too little and occupancy never reaches the assumption; spend too much and the payback runs past the point the lease term allows.

The lease term set the outer limit on how long the payback could be allowed to run, which meant the specification decision and the title question were the same decision. That is not how it had been presented to them.

Outcome

  • €125,000 total project cost, delivered in full
  • 85% occupancy achieved
  • Capital payback projected at five to six years
  • Two first-time investors in Asia who had hesitated for a long time, and did not lose money learning

What this shows

In an unfamiliar jurisdiction, the return is decided by the documents long before it is decided by the design.

A stream, a track and a price that ignored both — we advised against buying
General Luna, Siargao · Feasibility & market study · 650 m² leasehold · Recommendation: no-go
Open ↓Close ↑

Two French private investors, SK and NK, had found a 650 m² leasehold parcel at General Luna, Siargao, and intended to build two small rental villas on it. The selling agent's numbers looked attractive. They asked us to check them before committing.

Feasibility and market study. Clients anonymised at their request.

Recommendation
No-go
Payback found
8–10 yrs
Parcel
650 m²
Tenure
Lease
The parcel at General Luna seen from above
The parcel — second row, no sea frontage
The unsurfaced access track to the parcel
The access track — unsurfaced, and the reason the guest reviews would have suffered

What we found

  • A watercourse crossing the plot. Filling it was treated as a formality by the seller. It is not: it changes the foundation design, the drainage obligations and the flood behaviour of the site, and it is a cost nobody had priced.
  • Second-row position. No sea frontage, on an island where nightly rate is set almost entirely by proximity to the water.
  • An access track that fails in heavy rain. On a short-stay asset, access is not a detail. Guests who struggle to arrive write about it, ratings fall, and occupancy follows — which is the assumption the whole model rests on.
  • Climate exposure. Siargao sits in a typhoon corridor. That is not a reason to avoid the island; it is a reason to price insurance, downtime and rebuild reserve into the return, which the agent's figures did not.
  • The result, once all of it was costed: payback at eight to ten years on a leasehold with a finite term, against a land price set for a plot without any of these problems.

The recommendation

Do not buy. The island was right and the timing was reasonable; this particular parcel was not, and the price made no allowance for the three things that would decide the outcome.

They did not buy. They kept their capital, and they are still looking — with a clear list of what to check on the next one.

What this shows

The most valuable thing an advisor produces is sometimes a recommendation not to proceed. It is also the only one you can be sure was not written to earn a commission.

France — where the method comes from
Four owners, a rival developer and a UNESCO veto
Baziège, Haute-Garonne · 2021–2023 · 2 ha · 33 units · Delivered, 90% sold
Open ↓Close ↑

A two-hectare gap site fifteen minutes south of Toulouse, sitting between two completed subdivisions — and inside the protected setting of the Canal du Midi, a UNESCO World Heritage site. The land was held in four separate ownerships, including the commune itself and a competing developer, and no party held enough of it to build anything alone. It had stayed undeveloped for that reason, not for any reason to do with the market. The initial programme was fifty homes.

Work completed at HECTARE as Developer & Project Manager. Co-owners and adjoining parties anonymised.

Homes delivered
33
Land disposal
€3.0m
Programme lost
34%
Consent
No appeal
Masterplan of the Baziege subdivision showing sixteen serviced plots and two macro-lots
Delivered masterplan — 16 serviced plots of 371 to 601 m², two macro-lots for the houses and apartments
Completed streets and planting at the Baziege subdivision
After eight months of civil works — the public realm the reduced programme had to pay for

The mandate

Establish whether the scheme could be consented and started at all, given the ownership structure and the number of parties with the ability to stop it. If yes, deliver it.

What we did

  • Mapped the ownership before the design. Four landholdings, four different reasons for holding, four different definitions of a good outcome. The deadlock cut both ways: no party could develop alone, which made agreement the only route to value for any of them.
  • Removed the competing developer rather than negotiating with him. A rival at the table turns every subsequent decision into a two-party decision, over a programme not yet defined. We bought his position out above what it was worth to him standing alone — a premium paid once, at the start, rather than conceded slowly over three years.
  • Ran the remaining negotiation bilaterally. More than thirty meetings across twenty-two months, one relationship at a time. A joint session at the outset would have turned three private positions into three public ones.
  • Worked to whoever could decide, not whoever held the file. With three parties each holding a veto, the distance between the nominal contact and the actual decision-maker is measured in months.
  • Reset the product instead of defending the density. When network capacity capped the unit count, we redesigned upward in quality — larger plots, higher specification, a mix carrying the reduced volume on price rather than on number. The heritage requirement went into the design brief at the start rather than after a refusal.

The difficulty

Four owners with divergent expectations, one of them the consenting authority and one of them a competitor with every reason to slow the file. A site inside the protected perimeter of a UNESCO World Heritage site, placing it under the binding authority of the French state heritage architect — a veto over materials, roof pitch, colour and layout. Network capacity below what the programme required, which cut it from fifty homes to thirty-three before design had begun. A social housing quota and an imposed typology mix, neither of which shrank with the programme. And an organised group of neighbours who did not want the site developed at all, at any density.

The de-densification was the worst of them. A two-hectare site needs the same spine road, the same drainage and the same connections whether it carries fifty homes or thirty-three. €520,000 of civil works and €85,000 of studies did not shrink with the programme; they simply had to be carried by a third fewer units.

Outcome

  • 11 houses, 6 apartments, 16 serviced plots of 371 to 601 m²
  • €3.0m in land disposal, on two hectares
  • 30 months from first contact to completion, of which 8 months of civil works
  • Consented without appeal · Delivered · 90% sold

What this shows

Fragmented ownership is not the reason a site cannot be developed. It is usually the reason it has not been developed yet — which is a different problem, and a solvable one.

Maximum density, intelligently placed — 73 homes and six commercial units
Brens, Tarn · 2019–2023 · 5.5 ha · 3 phases · Delivered, 95% sold
Open ↓Close ↑

A 5.5-hectare greenfield subdivision at Brens, in the Tarn. The brief here was not complexity — it was return. Push the density as far as the plan would allow, but intelligently: large plots where the site could charge for them, compact ones where it could not, and enough product variety that no single buyer segment carried the scheme.

Work completed at HECTARE as Developer & Project Manager, from land negotiation through to delivery and handover.

Building plots
37
Sold
95%
Social housing
30
Phases
3
Masterplan of the Brens subdivision
Delivered masterplan — plots from 400 to 1,690 m², a social housing block, and six units for shops and professional practices
Entrance to the delivered neighbourhood at Brens
The entrance, on delivery
Completed street at Brens
Built out and occupied — 95% sold

What we did

  • Priced the density rather than maximising it. Large plots where the outlook and orientation justified a premium, compact ones on the interior. Same overall yield, better absorption.
  • Mixed the product deliberately. 37 individual building plots, 30 social housing units and 6 commercial and professional units, so the scheme was never dependent on a single buyer type or a single lender.
  • Phased in three tranches to fund each stage of infrastructure from the sales of the one before it, rather than carrying the whole works cost from the start.
  • Compressed the archaeology. A full excavation was required before any works. We ran the procedure in parallel with the remaining consents instead of in sequence, and secured state funding for the dig — the first scheme in the region to obtain it.

Outcome

  • 73 homes and 6 commercial units across 5.5 hectares
  • Delivered in three phases, works completed 2023
  • 95% sold
  • Four years from land to handover, archaeology included

What this shows

On a large scheme, return does not come from squeezing in more plots. It comes from putting the right plot in the right place, and from a phasing plan that lets the project pay for itself.

An abandoned scheme, rebuilt into seven hillside villas
Clermont-le-Fort, Haute-Garonne · 7 plots · Takeover of a stalled project · Delivered
Open ↓Close ↑

A stalled scheme on a sloping site south of Toulouse, abandoned by its previous promoter for want of financing. We took it over, reworked what was wrong with it, and turned it into a small high-end subdivision where each house is designed to sit into the slope rather than flatten it.

Work completed at HECTARE. Previous developer and landowners anonymised.

Plots
7
Status
Delivered
Position
Prime
Inherited
Stalled
Masterplan of the Clermont-le-Fort subdivision
Generous plots, a single looped access, and building envelopes set to follow the contours
The access road at Clermont-le-Fort with the surrounding countryside
The setting is the product — the layout was drawn to protect it
Landscaped turning area at Clermont-le-Fort
Turning head and planting, delivered

What we did

  • Diagnosed why it had stalled before redrawing anything. The scheme was not unviable; it was mispriced and under-engineered for the ground it sat on.
  • Rebuilt the hydraulic design. The inherited drainage and retention did not comply. It was redesigned and re-consented — the single item that would have stopped delivery whoever took the project on.
  • Worked with the slope instead of against it. Building envelopes and levels set per plot, so buyers design into the topography rather than paying to remove it.
  • Repositioned the product upward. Fewer, larger plots at a price the location genuinely supported, which is what made the numbers work where they had not before.

What this shows

An abandoned scheme is rarely a bad site. It is usually a good site with one unresolved technical problem and a price that was set before anyone found it.

Who you would be working with

Antoine Sailly, founder.

Antoine Sailly

Eight years turning land into neighbourhoods in France, and two advising on a second market from the inside. Antoine left HECTARE in 2023 as Regional Director, having opened the group's South West agency and built it from two people to nine.

The work was specific and unglamorous: finding land, testing what it could carry, and negotiating with municipalities that had no particular reason to help. Latitude exists because that method is not tied to a jurisdiction.

More about Antoine →
Notes

Latitude publishes what it learns.

Market notes, site studies and observations from development work in France and Southeast Asia. No newsletter, no gated downloads.